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Environment and Society. This year, we have 
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our political system. We hope you appreciate 
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isasters happen all the time. Since 
early mankind natural disasters 
like bush fires, heavy rainfall, 
flooding, volcanic eruptions and 
earthquakes have threatened mankind’s 
very existence. Of a more recent date, 
mostly since the Industrial Revolution, 
mankind has also been threatened through 
disasters related to the negative effects of 
technological developments. Explosions of 
industrial installations, industrial fires, 
marine oil pollution and even nuclear 
accidents, have also had devastating 
effects. Of even more recent origin is a 
third type of disaster that is equally man-
made, terrorism. The main difference 
between technological disasters on the one 
hand, and terrorism on the other, is that in 
case of technological disasters, classic 
legal remedies (such as imposing strict 
liability or mandating the purchase of 
liability insurance) could be employed to 
reduce disaster risk, whereas this is 
obviously more difficult in the case of 
terrorism.  
An important paradigm shift has occurred 
in the sense that (potential) victims and the 
public at large no longer accept Oliver 
Wendell Holmes’s adage “The loss lays 
where it falls”, meaning that victims just 
have to accept the bad luck of being hit by 
disaster. Also as a result of mass media, 
disasters trigger a lot of attention from 
politicians and a corresponding need to 
provide some form of disaster response. 
The question that arises from an economic 
perspective, is whether the disaster 
response (for example providing full 
compensation to victims of a disaster) is 
always economically efficient and 
desirable. That question is all the more 
pressing since there is not only an 
increasing tendency of politicians to 
provide generous compensation to victims 
after a disaster; there is equally 
overwhelming evidence that the damage 
resulting from disasters is increasing. In 
that respect it is striking that whereas the 
insured losses resulting from man-made 
disasters remained constant from 1970-
2007, the losses resulting from natural 
catastrophes increased substantially 
(Kunreuther 2008, 5). 
2. Goals of disaster response
A disaster response system should ideally 
fulfil two goals: 1) provide adequate 
compensation to victims of a disaster and 
2) provide adequate incentives for disaster
risk reduction. From an economic
perspective it may not seem obvious to
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argue that providing compensation to 
disaster victims should be a policy goal. 
However, a major difference between an 
“ordinary” accident (not involving a large 
amount of victims or property damage) and 
a catastrophe is precisely the fact that 
given the magnitude of the disaster its 
impact may have disruptive effects on 
society as a whole and consequently also 
on the economy. A nuclear accident, for 
example, could wipe out an entire 
neighbourhood and also claim the houses 
which served as collateral to back up a 
large amount of debt, potentially leading to 
a financial crisis. But economists have also 
pointed out that there exists a 
link between the goal of 
victim compensation and 
the second goal of 
disaster risk 
reduction. If this 
interrelationship 
between both 
goals is 
disregarded, the 
compensation 
could 
negatively 
affect ex ante 
incentives to 
invest in 
prevention of 
disaster, and 
therefore increase 
rather than decrease 
the disaster risk. 
Providing ex post 
compensation to victims 
may generate high political 
rewards. Providing compensation 
after the occurrence of a disaster is so 
politically attractive, that the government 
will often find it impossible to resist 
payment (Hirschleifer 1953; Viscusi 2010). 
Many countries therefore provide large 
amounts of compensation to victims after a 
disaster. For example, after hurricane 
Katrina (2005) the federal government 
committed a total amount of $88 billion to 
response, recovery and rebuilding efforts 
(Dari-Mattiacci and Faure 2015, 187-188). 
A problem is that this ex post 
compensation is often politically motivated 
and inefficient. Empirical research shows 
that payments by the US Federal 
Emergency Management Agency (FEMA) 
are often motivated by politics rather than 
by need (Gerrett and Sobel 2003). The 
inefficiency relates to the fact that ex post 
payments by the government may dilute 
the ex ante incentive for investments in 
disaster risk reduction. Potential victims, 
for example those living in flood-prone 
areas, count on ex post compensation, 
which thus dilutes incentives for 
prevention. Ex post government 
compensation was 
therefore qualified by 
one author as a 
“catastrophic 
response to 
catastrophic risk” 
(Epstein 1996). 
In addition, 
government 
provided 
compensation 
may not only 
dilute 
incentives to 
invest in 
disaster risk 
reduction, it may 
also create an 
incentive not to 
purchase insurance. 
In the words of one 
scholar: “Solidarity kills 
market insurance” (Gollier 
2005, 25). This problem, referred to 
as the “charity hazard” (Raschky and 
Weck-Hanneman 2007) has also been 
proven empirically: the willingness to 
purchase insurance decreases when 
potential victims can count on government 
compensation in the wake of disaster (Van 
Asseldonk et al. 2002). 
These examples show that there is a clear 
interrelationship between ex post 
compensation mechanisms and the 
"A 
problem 
is that this ex post 
compensation is 
often politically 
motivated 
and 
inefficient."
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incentives to invest ex ante in disaster risk 
reduction. This is also related to the fact 
that politicians may be rewarded too 
lightly from ex ante disaster risk reduction, 
and too highly from ex post compensation. 
The result may be systemic 
underinvestment in disaster prevention and 
overinvestment in ex post compensation 
(Depoorter 2006). It shows the necessity to 
be aware of the fact that the various phases 
of disaster response, precaution, relief and 
recovery, are interrelated (Dari-Mattiacci 
and Faure 2015). As a result, an 
integrative, holistic perspective is 
necessary whereby ex post instruments for 
compensation are chosen that provide 
efficient ex ante incentives for disaster risk 
reduction.  
3. Efficient instrument choice
From the previous analysis it follows that 
the goal of ex post victim compensation 
should be realised by using instruments 
that equally have a positive effect on the 
incentives for ex ante disaster risk 
reduction. In answering the question of 
which instruments might be appropriate to 
achieve that goal, the distinction between 
the three types of disasters, mentioned in 
the introduction, is of relevance again. The 
starting point should be that whenever an 
injurer can be identified, whose acts or 
omissions were the cause of a disaster, 
liability rules can be employed. The 
economic advantage of holding a 
tortfeasor, like an operator of a polluting 
plant, liable for the consequences of the 
disaster, is that a liability rule will provide 
excellent incentives for ex ante prevention: 
in order to avoid having to pay ex post 
compensation, operators will be 
incentivised to invest in ex ante disaster 
risk reduction. However, it is not enough to 
provide for a liability regime as the 
magnitude of a disaster could easily 
outweigh the assets of an operator. For that 
reason, the liability regime should be 
accompanied with financial guarantees 
such as bonds, or mandatory liability 
insurance, guaranteeing that the operator 
will be able to meet its obligations.  
The use of liability rules has the advantage 
that it can combine the goal of 
compensation with the goal of providing 
ex ante incentives for prevention. This has 
advantages both from society as well as 
from the business world’s point of view. 
The use of liability rules and mandatory 
solvency guarantees that mala fide 
operators would not be able to use the 
corporate structure (with its limited 
liability) to engage in hazardous activities, 
thus externalizing risk to society and de 
facto to the tax payers. And a structural 
liability regime also has the advantage of 
creating a level playing field for bona fide 
businessmen. It prevents rogue traders 
from distorting opportunities by creating 
hazardous activities with potentially 
insolvent companies. A generalised 
liability regime combined with mandatory 
solvency guarantees implies that all 
enterprises need to comply with the same 
safety levels, and thus all businesses face 
comparable costs. 
An important limitation of liability rules is, 
however, that it can only be employed 
when an injurer can be identified and held 
liable, in other words with technological 
"The result may be systematic 
underinvestment in disaster prevention 
and overinvestment in ex post 
compensation."
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disasters. With natural disasters and 
terrorism, liability rules can not usually be 
applied. An exception would constitute the 
case of a so-called hybrid disaster whereby 
the natural disaster was caused by human 
failure. An example would constitute the 
failure of the government to prevent the 
construction of a building in flood-prone 
area, or on the slope of a volcano. But in 
most legal systems the scope of this public 
authority liability is limited as a result of 
immunities (De Geest 2012). For natural 
disasters and terrorism another efficient 
solution should therefore be found. 
4. Market solutions for disaster response
4.1 First party insurance
The instrument which has been generally 
advocated as the optimal solution, as it can 
realise both victim compensation and 
provide incentives for disaster risk 
reduction, is first party insurance held by 
victims. It is an insurance scheme whereby 
potential victims, for example of damage 
as a result of a hurricane or flooding, 
would purchase insurance to cover 
themselves and their property. As insurers 
need to remedy the moral hazard risk that 
is related to insurance, they will require 
risk-reducing measures from the insured, 
and adapt the premiums accordingly. Risk-
related premium setting makes the 
potential victims aware of their risk 
exposure and provides incentives for 
prevention (Priest 1996). If this is the ideal 
solution that can meet both goals of a 
disaster response mechanism, why is this 
not used at a wider scale, and why is there 
still a problem? Authors have indicated 
that even for climate change related 
storms, hurricanes and other damage, first 
party insurance could in principle be used 
(Telesetsky and He 2016).  
4.2 Market failures 
Empirical evidence shows that 
notwithstanding the principal advantages 
of insurance, it is in practice often not 
used. The reasons relate to problems on the 
"The problem 
with disaster 
insurance is that, 
given the low 
probability and 
high damage 
nature of a 
disaster, the 
insured may never 
'benefit' from the 
premiums paid."
demand side as well as the supply side. On 
the demand side, individuals often have an 
“it will not happen to me” mentality 
(Kunreuther 1996, 175) as a result, they 
underestimate the probability of disasters. 
Individuals often consider insurance as an 
investment, and expect a return during 
their lifetime. The problem with disaster 
insurance is that, given the low probability 
and high damage nature of a disaster, the 
insured may never “benefit” from the 
premiums paid. Finally, as already 
indicated, the generous ex post 
compensation by the government may lead 
to the mentioned charity hazard, which 
could reduce incentives to purchase 
insurance. The consequence of this 
artificially low demand is that there is 
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overwhelming empirical evidence that 
potential victims underinsure, even in areas 
with high exposure to disasters. For 
example, after hurricane Katrina, it 
appeared that in some areas less than 20% 
of potential victims had purchased flood 
insurance (Daniels et al. 2006). Similar 
empirical evidence relates to earthquakes. 
The demand for earthquake insurance 
increases the year after an earthquake 
happened, but if in the subsequent two 
years no new earthquake took place, many 
policies are again cancelled. 
Problems also arise on the supply side. 
Insurers consider catastrophes “difficult to 
predict” (Gollier 2005), often leading to 
correlated losses, and to losses where the 
magnitude of damages is substantially 
larger than the capacity of the insurance 
and reinsurance market (Froot 1999).  
4.3 Remedies 
There are, however, remedies possible to 
cure the mentioned market failures. An 
obvious remedy to solve the problem of the 
lacking demand for earthquake insurance is 
to provide comprehensive compulsory 
insurance (Kunreuther 1968). It has the 
advantage that it will provide automatic 
coverage and, through the risk 
differentiation employed by the insurer, 
also incentivise disaster risk reduction 
(Priest 1996). 
The remedy proposed to deal with the 
supply side problem (lacking capacity) is 
to have the government support the 
catastrophe insurance market by acting as 
the insurer of last resort. This then leads to 
a multi-layered programme whereby, after 
insurers and reinsurers have provided their 
full capacity, a last layer of compensation 
is provided by the government. The major 
advantage of this model, especially 
compared to ad hoc ex post compensation, 
is that it supports the market mechanism in 
a structural manner and still provides 
incentives for disaster risk reduction 
(Bruggeman, Faure and Heldt 2012).  
Both solutions have been implemented in 
various legal systems. Mandatory disaster 
insurance has been introduced in France in 
1982 (Cannarsa, Lafay and Moréteau 
2006) and has been followed now in many 
other territories, such as Belgium, Spain, 
Norway and Taiwan (see for comparative 
overview Faure and Hartlief 2006). In 
France, homeowners who voluntarily 
purchase housing insurance are, as a result 
of regulatory duty, automatically insured 
against damage caused by natural disasters. 
This model is also largely supported by 
literature, and advocated as a remedy in the 
US, especially after consideration is given 
to the impacts of Hurricane Katrina 
(Kunreuther and Pauly 2006). The remedy 
on the supply side, where the government 
acts as the insurer of last resort, is 
implemented, again, in France, where the 
mandatory insurance against natural 
catastrophes is supported by the 
government finance Caisse Centrale de 
Réassurance (CCR) that provides 
unlimited reinsurance. In the US, in some 
cases the government acts as primary 
insurer. See for example the California 
Earthquake Authority (CEA) created in 
1996 after the 1994 Northridge earthquake, 
and in other cases federal support is 
provided for flood insurance via the 
National Flood Insurance Programme 
(NFIP). 
4.4 Implementation problems 
Notwithstanding the major advantages of a 
comprehensive mandate combined with a 
government intervention as insurer of last 
resort, this model is not always 
implemented to its full extent. One 
problem is that it may be difficult to 
implement mandatory insurance on the 
basis of risk-dependent premiums when 
vulnerable groups, especially those living 
in areas that may be affected by disasters, 
cannot afford to pay risk-related premiums. 
The answer to that problem is to introduce 
a system of vouchers that individual 
homeowners would receive on the 
condition that specific risk-reducing 
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measures would be taken. The advantage 
of this model is that insurance premiums 
still reflect risk, increasing risk awareness 
of potential victims. The voucher system, 
which again only provides subsidies if 
specific risk-reduction measures are 
introduced, can also avoid the charity 
hazard related to ex post government 
compensation (Kunreuther 2008).  
Specific design issues may arise. In 
France, the mandatory insurance is coupled 
with a mandatory additional premium for 
the disaster cover (of 12%) laid down in 
legislation. That may unnecessarily restrict 
competition (Van den Bergh and Faure 
2006). Ideally the intervention of the 
government as insurer of last resort should 
also require risk-related premiums 
(Levmore and Logue 2003), which is more 
than often not the case (Bruggeman, Faure 
and Heldt 2012). The NFIP provides 
subsidised premiums that do not 
sufficiently reflect risk, and thus do not 
provide adequate incentives for disaster 
risk reduction. For that reason the NFIP 
has been criticised. 
An important political problem is that 
politicians often impose the introduction of 
mandatory comprehensive disaster 
schemes, since ad hoc compensation gives 
politicians larger political benefits than 
investments in ex ante prevention 
(Depoorter 2006). A proposal in Germany 
to introduce mandatory disaster insurance 
in 2004 failed for a similar reason 
(Schwarze and Wagner 2007). In spite of 
these implementation challenges, it 
remains important to realise that only a 
holistic integrative perspective to disaster 
response, taking into account the fact that 
the design of ex post compensation can 
have a crucial influence on the ex ante 
incentives for disaster risk reduction, is the 
only way towards a sustainable solution for 
disaster response. 
5. Towards a sustainable solution
The statistics and predictions are clear: 
climate change will lead to more storms, 
heavy rains and hurricanes, all leading to 
increasing damage. The solution to those 
facts is not to simply use the public purse 
to provide more ex post compensation after 
yet another disaster took place. It is 
urgently needed to think ex ante about the 
preparedness for the inevitable disaster 
before it strikes again. That preparedness 
also entails working out a structural ex post 
compensation mechanism which provides 
appropriate incentives for disaster risk 
reduction. Mandatory comprehensive 
disaster insurance, supported by a 
government intervention as insurer of last 
resort, can reach that goal and should 
therefore be implemented at a much larger 
scale than is currently the case. 
"The solution to those facts is not to 
simply use the public purse to provide 
more ex post compensation after yet 
another disaster took place."
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